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CERCLA LIABILITY FOR PARENT
CORPORATIONS AFTER UNITED STATES V.
CORDOVA CHEMICAL COMPANY
OF MICHIGAN:

WHO PAYS FOR PAST WRONGS?
MATTHEW LEVERIDGE*

INTRODUCTION

In 1980 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act' (CERCLA) to address the
problems regarding which parties should be held liable for past and
future costs incurred in the cleanup of long-term environmental
degradation.2 The courts that have been faced with the problem of
interpreting the CERCLA liability provisions are split on who bears
liability for cleanup, 3 and the Supreme Court has not yet handed down
a definitive answer to end the uncertainty of CERCLA liability. On
May 13, 1997, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided
United States v. Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan,4 a case

mainly concerning whether a parent corporation. of the current owner

* Staff Member, Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law, J.D. expected

1999.
'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2 See generally New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1985)
(holding individual liable as operator because of ability to control corporate actions); United States
v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a parent corporation can be
directly liable as an operator if it exerts control over the subsidiary), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084
(1991); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
parent corporation will be liable only if the elements necessary to pierce the corporate veil are met);
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re. Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F. Supp.
22 (D. Mass 1987) (holding that a dissolved corporation was rightly revived to be accountable for
its contribution to the contamination).
'Compare United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 and Lansford-Coaldale
Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993) with Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James
& Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d
572 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that a parent corporation can only be liable for the actions
of its subsidiary when the elements necessary to pierce the corporate veil are met), cert. granted,
sub nom. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 621 (1997).
' United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997).
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on a hazardous waste site could be held liable for cleanup costs incurred
in the release of several types of pollutants, where the release took place
over many years under the watch of multiple corporate owners.'
This Comment will focus on the decision in the Cordova case
and will analyze the various issues presented. Part I of this Comment
will focus on the background of the case itself and will set forth the
procedural history as well as the facts of the case. Part II will present
an analysis of the legal background of the issues contained in the case.
Part III will compare the court's reasoning with the standard set by
previous decisions in this and other courts. Finally, Part IV will focus
on this author's analysis of the decision which rejects the court's
holding that operator liability will only extend to those parent
corporations where the conduct necessary to pierce the corporate veil
is present.
I. CASE HISTORY

From approximately 1957 to 1965, the Ott Chemical Company
(Ott I) owned a site on which it operated a chemical manufacturing
plant located in Dalton Township, Michigan.6 CPC International (CPC)
purchased Ott Chemical Company (Ott II) in 1965 and maintained
ownership of the site until 1972.' During this period of ownership by
Ott H, CPC exerted control over several aspects of the business
operations of Ott II including finance, environmental, labor and
management.8 In June 1972 Ott II was sold to Story Chemical
Company (Story); 9 however, in 1977 Story declared bankruptcy, and the
bankruptcy trustee who gained title to the site began trying to find a
new purchaser."
In 1977, after Story's bankruptcy, the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources (MDNR) visited the site to assess environmental
damage." Since the environmental problems at the site were so severe
5

d. at 575.
CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549 at 555 (W.D. Mich. 1991),
affdinpart,rev'd inpart,subnonk United Statesv. CordovaChemical Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584
(6th Cir. Mich. 1995), rehearing en bane and judgment vacated, United States v. Cordova
Chemical Co. of Mich., 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. Mich 1995), affd in part, rev 'd in part, United
States v. Cordova Chemical Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, sub noma.
United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 621 (1997).
6

' 777 F.Supp. at 555.
'Id. at 555-62.
9Id. at 562.
1Ild.

" CPClnt'l,Inc., 777 F. Supp. at 562.
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and there was a lack of state funds to pay for the cleanup of the site,
MDNR became involved in an effort to locate a buyer for the site who
would be willing to take part in a cleanup effort.12 From these efforts,
MDNR began negotiations with Aerojet, Inc. (Aerojet) and its
subsidiary, Cordova Chemical Company (Cordova/California). 3 As a
result of these negotiations, Aerojet agreed to pay for some of the
cleanup costs, and in return, Aerojet was assured that it would not be
held financially responsible for future cleanup operation costs that
resulted from contamination by prior owners. 4 The terms of this
agreement between Cordova/California and MDNR were spelled out in
a "stipulation and consent order" which was signed by both parties on
October 13, 1977. " The following day, Cordova/California officially
purchased the site from Story's bankruptcy trustee.16 Not long before
Aerojet began to produce chemicals at the site, it incorporated
Cordova/Michigan as a wholly owned subsidiary of
Cordova/California. 17 Ownership of the site was subsequently
transferred to Cordova/Michigan.18
Under the control of Ott I and the subsequent owners, the site
was used as a plant for the production of chemicals. 9 During the
control of Ott I and Ott II, chemicals and waste products from the
manufacturing processes were discarded into unlined lagoons located
on the site.2" Seepage from these lagoons resulted in the contamination
of the groundwater below the facility.21 Additionally, contamination
occurred as a result of the burial of split chemical drums, spillage from
train cars and overflows from the cement-lined equalization basin.22
However, the district court found that "no disposal into the lagoons
'
occurred during the Story or Cordova periods."23
The original action in this matter was decided by the United
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan in CPC
24 In Aerojet,
International v. Aerojet-General Corporation.
Judge
12
Id. at 563.
13Id

at 563-64.
"1Idat 564.
6
"'CPC Int'l, Inc., 777 F. Supp. at 564.
17Id. at 568.
18Id
9Id. at 555-56.
"Id at 556.
" CPC Int'l, Inc., 777 F. Supp. at 556.
2Id
1"Id

23Id.
4
2 1d. at 549.
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Hillman held that CPC was liable as an operator of the facility under the
"owned and operated" language of CERCLA.25 This imposed a "new,
middle ground" approach of liability on CPC for its direct involvement
in several important aspects of the business of Ott H, involvement
which amounted to actual control of the facility as envisioned by the
drafters of CERCLA.2 6 The court recognized that while that situation
did not present itself here, a parent corporation might also incur liability
for the actions of its subsidiary if the elements necessary to pierce the
corporate veil were present.27 Finally, the court held that MDNR did
not incur arranger liability2" since MDNR was reacting to an
environmental emergency, and it made a good faith effort to find a
buyer who was willing to assist the state in cleanup activities by
defraying some of the cost. 9

The case was then appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in UnitedStatesv. CordovaChemicalCompanyofMichigan.3"
The appellate court rejected the imposition of operator liability on CPC
for its control over Ott II and overruled the district court's "new,
middle ground" approach to CERCLA liability.31 Further, the court
held that under the language of CERCLA, the only way a parent
corporation could be liable for the actions of one of its subsidiaries is
when the elements necessary to pierce the corporate veil are met?2 The
court found that the elements needed to pierce the corporate veil were
not met with respect to CPC and consequently reversed the district
court's imposition of operator liability on CPC.33 The court further
held that the lower court was correct in its analysis with respect to
MDNR and affirmed that ruling.3 4
A petition for rehearing en banc was granted in the case. 5 On
rehearing the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the earlier
court and held that under the meaning of CERCLA, the only way a

25Id. at 580. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
26

CPC Int'l, Inc., 777 F. Supp. at 573.
Id. at 574 and 578.
's 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (a)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that an arranger is "any person
who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment... by any other party
or entity, at29any facility... containing such hazardous substances."
CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Acorojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. at 577.
" United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F3d. 584 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated,
67 F3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995).
31Id. at 589-90.
11Id at 590.
1Id. at 591.
34Id.
" United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 67 F.3d 586.
17
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parent corporation could be liable for the actions of its subsidiary was
through the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. 36 The
court reasoned that Congress did not intend to extend a wider net of
operator liability than the one that was already well established under
the common law." The court also upheld the reasoning ofthe previous
courts in ruling that MDNR did not incur arranger liability through its
part in the action since it was exempted under CERCLA for responding
to an emergency situation that was the result of the actions of another
person.3 8
II. ISSUES AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

CERCLA has a specific provision that provides liability for the
owner or operator of a facility which releases hazardous substances into
the environment.3 9 42 U.S.C.A. 9607(a) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law,
and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection
(b) of this section-(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed...
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment
facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs,
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-(A) all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the United States Government or
a State... not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan....

The courts that have had the opportunity to interpret this statute

at 580.
I' at 579-80.
Id.
United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc), cert. granted, sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 621 (1997) (citing42 U.S.C.A.
§9607(d)(2)).
'9 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a).
'6 Id.
'8
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have come to differing views on the meaning of its language. These
differing approaches are discussed in detail below.
A.

Owner Liability Generally

CERCLA imposes liability on any person who owned the site
at the time of the contamination 4' and also on the person who is the
current owner of the site, if that person is different from the one who
owned the site at the time of the release.42 Some courts have held that
it is irrelevant whether the owner actually had any part in the operation
of the facility, causing liability to attach regardless of whether or not
the owner actually had a hand in the release of the hazardous
substance.4" Therefore, under CERCLA owner liability the pertinent
factors are whether the entity owned the site at the time of the release
or is the current owner of a contaminated site.'
While owner liability is a relatively straightforward concept
with regard to whom liability attaches, CERCLA does provide for
exceptions to the general rule.45 Section 10 1(3 5) allows an exemption
from liability for any person who can establish that she did not know
nor had reason to know of the contamination at the time title to the site
was acquired." This allows for a person who, through reasonable
investigation of a site for contamination, could not know of a release or
threatened release to escape the burden of owner liability. Congress
also holds exempt from owner liability any person who "without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
'
Therefore, a creditor who maintains an interest in
facility."47
ownership to protect a monetary interest, without more, will not incur
owner liability."

442

U.S.C.A § 9601(21) defines "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation,..

.commercial entity... or any interstate body."
4142 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2).
42 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1).
4 United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988).
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1992).
S42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35) (exemption for owner who did not know and had no reason
to know of contamination at a facility); 42 U.S.C.A. § 101(20)(A) (owner does not include a

person who without participation in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest).
42 U.S.C.A. § 101(35)(A)(i).

4742
U.S.C.A. § 101(20)(A)(i).
4

Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1104-05
(5th Cir. 1973).
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Operator Liability Through Direct Control
1.

Actual Control by an Individual

One of the earliest cases that dealt with direct liability was
State of New York v. Shore Realty Group49. In Shore Realty, the
Second Circuit held that an individual (Leo Grande) could be liable as
an operator since he was "in charge of the operation of the facility in
question and as such [was] an 'operator' within the meaning of
CERCLA."5 The court went on to state that Leo Grande was liable as
an operator for his direct participation in the management of the facility
as well as for his control over "corporate conduct."'" The court stated
that "a corporate officer who controls corporate conduct and thus is an
active individual participant in that conduct is liable for the torts of the
corporation."52 Shore Realty presented one of the first instances where
direct control of a facility could cause a person to incur liability for the
control of the violating facility;-3 however, while Shore Realty dealt
with an individual, the holding was broad enough to spread to parent
corporations as well.
In a similar case dealing with individual liability, the Eighth
Circuit found an individual liable because his role as plant supervisor
gave him actual knowledge of and control over the polluting events,
even though he did not have actual possession of the hazardous
substances at the time of release.54 The court reasoned that the ability
to control and stop the release of hazardous substances was enough for
the plant supervisor to incur liability as an operator since he
"personally participated in conduct that violated CERCLA." 55 Again,
this case deals with individual liability; however, applying the same
reasoning to a similar case where the parent corporation is in control of
the corporate activities would be an easy step.

New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
SId. at 1052.
1 Id.

Id.
5' Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under
CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 65, 105 (1992).
" United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 745 (8th
Cir. 1986).
52

55Id at 744.
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Ability to Control
a.

Ability to control sufficient in the 1980's

Along with holding individuals liable for their direct actions as
operators under CERCLA,"6 courts have held that the mere ability to
control a corporation is enough to incur operator liability. In the first
of these cases, State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill Company," the District
Court of Idaho held a parent corporation liable for the actions of its
subsidiary for several reasons. The court held that the parent
corporation was intimately familiar with the practices of hazardous
waste disposal at the subsidiary and "had the capacity, if not total
reserved authority, to make decisions and implement actions and

mechanisms to prevent and abate the damage caused by the disposal
and releases of hazardous waste at the facility.""8 The court imposed
owner liability on the parent corporation, using language that suggested
the ability to control waste disposal practices is enough to incur direct
operator liability.59
In Colorado v. ldaradoMining Co., the District Court for the
District of Colorado held a parent liable under CERCLA as an operator
because, inter alia,the parent had the "power to direct the activities of
persons who control the mechanisms causing the pollution. The
owner[-]operator has the power to prevent and abate the damage."'
This court, like the Bunker Hill court, bypassed facts which pointed to
a more direct involvement on the part of the parent and based liability
simply on the parent's ability to control the subsidiary, leading to the
conclusion that liability was based not on actual involvement but on the
mere status as parent.61
Similarly, in State of Vermont v. Staco,62 the court held that
simply participating in the management of a facility was enough to
incur operator liability, stating that "liability is based on responsibility
rather than fault."63 The Staco court, following the same line of

"See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
" Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
"Id. at 672.
"9Id.
6oColorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 18 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20578 (D. Colo.
1987).

6'Healy, supra note 53, at 117.
62Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988), vacatedin part on other

grounds,Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 1989 WL 225428 (D. Vt. 1989).
6'Id.

at 831.
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reasoning used by the Bunker Hill and IdaradoMining courts, stated
that CERCLA imposes liability on the owner or manager of a facility
from which there is a release of a hazardous substance regardless of a
causal link between the actions of the owner or manager and the release
of the substance.' That court, as had previous courts, ignored facts
upon which direct liability could be based and instead based liability on
the power of an owner or manager to control.6" Additionally, in United
States v. Nicolet, Inc.,66 the court held that a parent corporation was
liable for cleanup costs because the parent "was familiar with the waste
disposal practices, had the capacity to control both the disposal and
resultant release as well as to abate damage from such releases, and
benefitted from the waste disposal practices."67 The Nicolet court
opined that a creditor could be liable for actions of the debtor
corporation if the creditor participated in the day-to-day management
of that corporation,68 leading to the conclusion that participation in
management is enough for operator liability.
b.

More than ability to control necessary in the
1990's

Other courts have taken a different approach to the idea of
direct operator liability and have held that merely the ability to control
is not enough. These courts have required a definite showing that the
parent has exercised actual, measurable control over the subsidiary. In
1997 the Third Circuit decided Aluminum Company of America v.
Beazer East, Inc., holding that the parent corporation had to meet the
"actual control" test to incur liability as an operator.6 9 In this case, the
court stated:
Under the actual control standard, a
corporation will only be held liable for the
environmental violations of another corporation when
there is evidence of substantial control exercised by
one corporation over the activities of the other.... A

corporation cannot hide behind the corporate form to

6 Id.
65 Id

"United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Penn. 1989).
' 7 1d at 1203-04.
"Id at 1204-05.
69Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 563 (3d Cir. 1997).
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escape liability in those instances in which it played an
active role in the management of a corporation
70
responsible for environmental wrongdoing.
In setting forth the "actual control" doctrine of direct liability, the court
followed the intent of Congress in allowing responsible parties to be
liable for environmental degradation; however, the net of CERCLA
7
liability is not spread so broad as to catch innocent parties. '
In Schiavone v. Pearce,one year earlier, the Second Circuit
held, as did the court in Beazer East, that the liability of the parent
corporation stems directly from the control it exerts, completely
independent of any action or liability on the part of the subsidiary."'
The court noted that "[a] recognition of direct operator liability for
parent corporations is both compatible with the statutory language and
73
consistent with CERCLA's broad remedial scheme."
The Third Circuit in Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v.
Tonolli Corp. rejected the "ability to control" test adopted by earlier
courts74 and held that a parent corporation will be liable as an operator
75
if it exerts "actual control" over the actions of the subsidiary. The
Lansford-Coaldalecourt noted that Congress has expanded corporate
liability through the "operator" language of CERCLA, and therefore
despite common law limited liability, a corporation may be held liable
for the actions of a subsidiary.7 6 Further, the court noted that
CERCLA's remedial purpose is "its 'essential purpose' of making
'those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful
conditions they created."' 77
Similarly, the First Circuit held in UnitedStates v. Kayser-Roth
Corp. that a parent corporation could be held liable as an operator of a
facility if it had more than ownership and the normal control that
accompanies it.7 A parent must be actively involved in the activities
of its subsidiary for a parent to incur liability for actions that are not its

70Id. at 563, quoting Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d
1209, 1221-22 (3d Cir. 1993).
"Healy, supra note 53, at 124-28.
" Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 1996).
7 Id. at 255.
"See infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
n Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3rd Cir. 1993).
76Id. at 1221.

Id.(citing John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401,405 (1st Cir. 1993)).
"United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990).
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own. 7 1 In its opinion, the Kayser-Roth Corp. court noted that CERCLA

was primarily a remedial statute designed to be an aid to the
environment, and the terms of the Act should be construed liberally to
help further the intent of Congress."0 In this broad construction of the
statute, a parent corporation can be seen as an operator, and as such
will not be "protected from liability by the legal structure of [corporate]
ownership."'" Furthermore, "corporate status, while relevant to
determine ownership, cannot shield a person from operator liability."8 2
3.

Case Requiring Showing of a Sham Corporation

In 1990 the Fifth Circuit took a different approach to the idea
of operator liability through direct control in Joslyn Manufacturing
Company v. TL. James & Co., Inc.83 The Joslyn court held that a
parent corporation who participated directly in the affairs of its
subsidiary was not liable for the violations of the subsidiary' because
"[v]eil piercing should be limited to situations in which the corporate
entity is used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personal
liability.""5 In Joslyn, the court found that no fraud had been intended
and declined to extend CERCLA liability beyond what has been
traditionally followed in the common law veil piercing cases, a
standard it did not feel Congress had intended to be changed.'
The Joslyn court declined to extend liability to include direct
operator liability because it thought that doing so would weaken the
common law standard set forth in a long line of precedent.87 The court
also found the fact that CERCLA did not define owners or operators to
include parent corporations of the offending subsidiary important in
reaching its conclusion.8 8 This lack of specificity led the court to
reason that Congress did not intend to catch parent corporations in this
net of liability simply because they are parent corporations.8 9 Instead,
the court noted "[tlhe 'normal rule of statutory construction is that if

79

id.

mId at26.
id.

82id.

Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 81-82.
ISldat 83.
871d.
u Joslyn Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d at 82.
89
1d

J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L.

[VOL. 13:1

Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a
judicially created concept, it makes the intent specific."'" In view of
this, "[w]ithout an express Congressional directive to the contrary,
common-law principles of corporation law, such as limited liability,
govern our court's analysis."9 From these ideas, the court opined that
to hold a parent liable for the actions of its subsidiary without first
meeting the elements required to pierce the corporate veil would "alter
traditional concepts of corporation law."92
C.

Derivative Operator Liability Through Common Law Piercing
of the Corporate Veil

Courts that have had the opportunity to address the issue, even
those that disagree on direct liability, agree that a parent corporation
can be held liable for the actions of a subsidiary through piercing of the
93
corporate veil, also known as derivative liability. Under the rubric of
derivative liability, there are differing opinions as to what elements are
necessary to pierce the corporate veil.' Discussing piercing the
corporate veil outside the CERCLA arena, the Sixth Circuit in
Bodenhamer Building Corporation v. Architectural Research
Corporationannounced the elements necessary to reach beyond the
corporate form were: "[F]irst, the corporate entity must be a mere
instrumentality of another entity or individual; second, the corporate
entity must be used to commit a fraud or wrong; third, there must have
5
been an unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff."" At least one
commentator has suggested that there are more elements to be met
when deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil in the CERCLA
arena.' In a speech to the 1991 Environmental Law Enforcement
Conference, Deputy Assistant Attorney General George Van Cleve said
that to pierce the corporate veil in a CERCLA action the following
factors had to be met: (1) inadequate capitalization; (2) extensive
9Id. at 82-83.
91Id. at 83.
2

9 d. at 82.
" Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990); United States

v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor
Proceedings re. Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass 1987).
Compare Bodenhamer, 873 F.2d 109 with Deputy Assistant Attorney General George
Van Cleve, Address at the 1991 Environmental Law Enforcement Conference, Principles of
CERCLA Liability- An Overview, (Jan. 9, 1991).
"Bodenhamer, 873 F.2d at 112.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General George Van Cleve, Address at the 1991
Environmental Law Enforcement Conference (Jan. 9, 1991).
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control by the parent corporation; (3) intermingling of subsidiary and
parent accounts and/or property; (4) lack of corporate separateness; (5)
use of the subsidiary funds by the parent; (6) lack of corporate records
and (7) misuse or non-use of officers or directors. 97
Generally, courts do not go to such an in-depth degree of
analysis when deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil; 98 instead,
courts generally look at whether the subsidiary is an "instrumentality"
of the parent and the separate corporate existence is used to perpetrate
a fraud or to subvert justice.99 In this regard, the forming of a
corporation solely to avoid liability does not in itself subvert justice or
perpetrate a fraud worthy of piercing the corporate veil when the parent
abides by the appropriate use of the corporate form. " Therefore, when
a parent does not use the subsidiary as an "instrumentality" warranting
derivative liability or exert direct control over the subsidiary, the parent
will not be liable for the actions of the subsidiary.''
HI. OPINION AND REASONING

In Cordova, the Sixth Circuit held that a parent corporation
would not be liable for its subsidiary's release of hazardous substances
and the resultant costs associated with the cleanup of the site if the
elements necessary to establish derivative liability were absent. 102 In
coming to this decision, the court explicitly rejected the idea that the
language of CERCLA provided for direct liability when a parent
corporation actually controls many of the activities of the subsidiary.'0 3
The court stated that financial responsibility should fall on culpable
parties, but "the widest net possible ought not be cast in order to snare
those who are either innocently or tangentially tied to the facility at
issue. -" "°
In reaching this conclusion, the court first turned to the issue
of the remedial purpose of CERCLA which is to "protect and preserve
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Id.

"But see In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re. Alleged PCB
Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass 1987).
Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 1995).
" Gledhill v. Fisher & Co., 262 N.W. 371, 373 (Mich. 1935).
'0'Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. v. Architectural Research Corp., 873 F.2d 109, 112 (6th
Cir. 1989).
102 United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572,
580 (6th Cir. 1997)
(en banc), cert. granted,sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 621 (1997).
'Mo'aat 578.
'0'Id. at 580.
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public health and the environment."' 5 In this regard, the court
emphasized that with CERCLA, a statute that is notorious for poor
drafting and is an "eleventh hour compromise," it is difficult to
determine Congress' specific intent in enacting the statute."0 6 As such,
the court reasoned that courts should not rely on the remedial purpose
of CERCLA to fill in blanks that are left by the legislative history 1in
07
order "to impose liability under nearly every conceivable scenario."'
The court then turned to the specific facts of the case and to the
district court's analysis. It characterized the district court holding as
placing liability on a parent corporation in two ways: first, through
direct liability as an operator under the operator language of CERCLA,
and second, through common law veil piercing. I"" The court found
problems with the district court's "new middle ground" idea of direct
operator liability, saying that it replaced the bright line test established
by traditional veil piercing analysis, and it would deter private
companies from participating in the cleanup of contaminated sites
because they would be open to unlimited liability."° Additionally, the
court found confusion with the "new middle ground" approach and
therefore rejected the district court's imposition of direct operator
liability, stating that "[w]e are not persuaded that . . .Congress
contemplated the abandonment of traditional concepts of limited
liability associated with the corporate form in favor of an undefined
'new middle ground.""' 0
To come to this conclusion and holding, the Cordova court
rejected the majority view, which allows a parent to be liable as an
operator for its direct actions over the subsidiary,"' and instead went
with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Joslyn."' This reasoning
appealed to the court because it found that nothing in CERCLA or its
legislative history alluded to the idea of expansion of corporate liability
beyond traditional common law concepts." 3 The court stated that "if
Congress wanted to extend liability to parent corporations it could have
"' Id at 577 (citations omitted).
'MId at 578.
"o Cordova, 113 F.3d at 578.
1Id. at 578-79.
'09Id. at 580.
"Old.at 579.
I Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer East, Inc., 1997 WL 535176 (3rd Cit. Sept. 2,
1997); Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
12 Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
" United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 579 (6th Cir. 1997)
(en banc), cert. granted, sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 621 (1997).
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done so and remains free to do so."" 4
Although the current trend in CERCLA liability analysis was
moving toward a broad reading of the statute which would cover parent
corporations who exerted enough control over their subsidiaries to
warrant extending operator liability to them," 5 the Cordova court went
with a contrary holding and declined to extend the scope of CERCLA
operator liability." 6 This holding is inconsistent with the rulings of
several other circuits." 7 The district court stated operator liability
should be based on an actual control test using a "new, middle ground"
analysis"' and in doing so had followed a now accepted view that a
parent corporation can incur liability based upon its control of a
subsidiary, thereby nullifying the need for a derivative liability analysis
in many cases.9
IV. CONCLUSION

CERCLA "is a remedial statute designed to protect and
preserve public health and the environment." 2 As such, the language
of the statute must be read broadly to avoid frustrating the legislative
purpose.' The holding of the Sixth Circuit on the issue of operator
liability through "actual control" of a subsidiary does not follow the
intent of Congress and goes against the weight of authority on the
subject. 2 2 Other circuits have stated that CERCLA is a remedial
statute designed to be an aid to the environment and as such the terms
should be construed liberally to further the intent of Congress. 123
Following from this reasoning the First, 24 Second, 25 Third,'26 and
14

Id at 579-80 (quoting Joslyn Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d at 83).
"'BeazerEast,Inc., 1997 WL 535176.
116Cordova, 113 F.3d at 572.
17CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aeorojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mich. 1991),
aff'd in part,rev'd inpart,sub non United States v. Cordova Chemical Co. of Mich., 59F.3d 584
(6th Cir. 1995), rehearingenbancandudgment vacated,United States v. Cordova Chemical Co.
of Mich., 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995), aff'd in part,rev 'din part, United States v. Cordova
Chemical Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,sub nom, United States v.
Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 621 (1997).
"Id. at 573.
"9 United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
'2lId
at26.
121Id.
1

2

' 2

See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.

" See supra note 88.

121Kayser-Roth, Corp., 910 F.2d 24.
'23Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996).
2' Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer East, Inc., 1997 WL 535176 (3d Cir. Sept. 2,

1997).
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Eighth Circuits,1 27 and several District Courts"' have held that a parent
can be liable as an operator if it exerts control over the subsidiary that
is outside the realm of normal parent ownership and operation. Only
the Fifth Circuit has rejected the idea of direct operator liability and
gone solely with the theory of derivative liability to hold a parent liable
for the actions of its subsidiaries. 29
Further, the Cordovacourt wrongly assumes that to hold CPC
liable for the actions of Ott HI, the district court had to find CPC
3
accountable for Ott I's environmental conduct. ' This does not follow
from the "actual control" test that was announced in LansfordCoaldale.3' To incur liability under this test, a parent corporation has
to control enough of the subsidiary's operations to be seen as an
operator of the facility responsible for the environmental violation. A
parent would not have to actually control the environmental operations
of the facility, just enough of the operations to be seen as operating the
facility as a whole.' 32
The court also reasoned that the control test introduced by the
district court would be an unworkable test because of its nebulous
nature.' 33 This characterization of the control test fails to look to the
previous decisions in other circuits where those courts have
experienced no difficulty in fashioning control tests that are not only
workable, but also enhance the intent of Congress in enacting
CERCLA.

134

Additionally, the court stated that to replace the "bright line"
test available in a veil piercing analysis with a control test would pose
problems in future cases. 3 ' What the court failed to recognize is that
several factors go into an analysis of when to pierce the corporate veil,
and rarely do courts agree on what factors to apply in that test. Even
assuming that a veil piercing analysis is a bright line test, it has only
127United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (Sth Cir.

1995) (holding that ability to control is enough but still recognizing the idea of direct operator
liability).
'2 See generally,Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 18 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20578 (D. Colo. 1987); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (both
recognizing that ability to control, a broad version of direct operator liability, is enough for
CERCLA liability under the "operator" language).
"' Joslyn Mfg Co. v. T.L. James Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).

" United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 579 (6th Cir. 1997)
(en banc), cert. granted,sub noa United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 621 (1997).
"' Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993).
132Id

'33Cordova, 113 F.3d at 580.
"4

See supra notes 142-145.

131Cordova, 113 F.3d at 580.
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become so over many years and with much work from the judiciary. In
its early days, even a concept so "traditional" as veil piercing likely
gave the courts problems with knowing which factors to apply in
determining when derivative liability was appropriate. When veil
piercing was a young concept, it too probably looked unworkable.
Therefore, we cannot expect that a relatively new doctrine of liability,
such as direct operator liability under CERCLA, will automatically be
an easy test to administer. Like the veil piercing test, this "actual
control" test can only become "traditional" with hard work and time.
In future cases, the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court should
read the language of CERCLA to include direct operator liability for
parent corporations when those parents are actually involved in the
operation of a subsidiary which is responsible for environmental
violations. This will not, as the court predicts, lead to unlimited
liability because there is an innocent purchaser exemption written into
the statute.' 36 In addition, an expansive reading of the statute will be

more in line with the purpose of CERCLA; it will also bring about a
national standard among the circuits that would make liability a more
definite matter.
In conclusion, the better standard is adopted by the Third
Circuit in Beazer East.'37 The standard adopted by the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits 38 frustrates the intent of Congress and compromises
environmental integrity by allowing corporations to hide behind the
corporate form when they should be participating in the cleanup of
contaminated sites.

See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
See sources cited, supra notes 74-77.
13"
Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. CordovaChem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 579 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. granted,
sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 621 (1997).
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